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INTRODUCTION

On March 20, 1990, the Connecticut Supreme Court reversed a
decision of the New Haven Housing Court in Savage v. Aronson,' a
case brought by the Yale Law School Clinical Program. The trial
court had issued a state-wide injunction on behalf of all homeless families2 residing in emergency housing, ordering Connecticut's welfare
commissioner to stop enforcing the state mandated one-hundred-day
maximum on emergency housing assistance.3 The trial court found
that high rents, low levels of Aid to Families with Dependent Chil* Stephen Wizner is the William O. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law and Director of
Clinical Studies at the Yale Law School. The author wants to thank Robert Ellickson for
giving him a reason to write this Article, Ian Shapiro for helping him clarify his argument, and
Melissa Lawrence for her creative research and editing.
1. 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990).
2. Id. at 260, 571 A.2d at 699. A purpose of this Article is to resist the narrow definition
of homelessness offered by the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act. The Act
defines the term "homeless" or "homeless individual" as follows:
(1) an individual who lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime
residence; and
(2) an individual who has a primary nighttime residence that is:
(A) a supervised publicly or privately operated shelter designed to provide
temporary living accommodations (including welfare hotels, congregate shelters,
and transitional housing for the mentally ill);
(B) an institution that provides a temporary residence for individuals
intended to be institutionalized; or
(C) a public or private place not designed for, or ordinarily used as a
regular sleeping accommodation for human beings.
Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act § 103(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11302 (1987). According to this definition, only homeless people who visibly present themselves in public realms are
classified as "homeless." Many people who lack a stable residence cluster together in overcrowded apartments, "doubling up" with friends or relatives who, most often, are extremely
poor themselves. Because these people are seen as coping, they are excluded from the definition of "homeless" in the McKinney Act.
3. Savage, 214 Conn. at 259-60, 571 A.2d at 699 (Commissioner of housing was to evict
all tenants of welfare motels and other emergency housing units after a one-hundred-day

stay.).
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dren ("AFDC") 4 benefits, and lack of rent subsidies had prevented
these families from obtaining affordable housing.5 After finding that
families lodged in welfare motels as an emergency measure had been
unable to locate permanent residences,6 the trial court enjoined the
welfare commissioner from evicting them except to permanent hous-

ing.7 In so holding, the trial court accepted the plaintiffs' interpretation of the Connecticut AFDC statutes, 8 that the state was required to
support dependent children and their caretaker relatives in a "home,"
and that for those clients, the welfare motel was "home." 9

The Connecticut Supreme Court, narrowly construing the Connecticut AFDC statute, rejected the trial court's interpretation and
reinstated the Commissioner's one-hundred-day rule. 10 As a result,

this decision subjected nearly one thousand families, most of which
were mothers with young children, to eviction from emergency housing because their welfare benefits were insufficient to enable them to
obtain affordable housing." Ignoring this tragic result, the court reasoned that emergency housing in welfare motels must be a temporary
12
relief measure, used only as a last and brief resort.
Although the trial court's statutory construction revealed an
attractively humane response to the plight of the homeless, legitimate

questions remain whether the trial court's interpretation of the AFDC
statute would have helped Connecticut's homeless in the long run.
The trial court's decision does not address the underlying causes of
homelessness in Connecticut, nor does it look at the practical realities
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1987). AFDC is a joint federal/state program established under
Subchapter IV-A of the Social Security Act. States set minimum standards of need and are
given considerable discretion in determining the degree to which benefit levels must meet those
needs. See Newman & Schnare, Reassessing Shelter Assistance: The InterrelationshipBetween
Welfare and Housing Programs,in HOUSING ISSUES OF THE 1990's, at 121-23 (S.Rosenberry
& C. Hartman eds. 1989).
States differ markedly in their calculations of payment standards for shelter under AFDC.
Id. at 122. Under AFDC, a similar family of three would receive a housing allowance ranging
from $20 in Mississippi to $260 in Washington state. Id. at 127-32. A Mississippi family of
four would receive a shelter payment that is close to 8% of the estimated cost of standard
housing in that area, while the same family in Washington state would receive more than 90%
of its estimated shelter needs. Id. at 122. In addition, AFDC shelter payments, in the large
majority of states, fall considerably below the costs of standard rental housing in those states.
Id. at 128-32.
5. Savage, 214 Conn. at 260, 571 A.2d at 699.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. The author served as plaintiffs' counsel in this action. Id. at 257, 571 A.2d at 698.
9. Id. at 260, 571 A.2d at 699.
10. Id. at 258, 571 A.2d at 699.
11. Id. at 257, 571 A.2d at 698.
12. See id. at 274-77, 571 A.2d at 706-07.
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of housing homeless families in welfare motels. Welfare motels are an
expensive means of housing homeless families, ranging from seventy
to ninety dollars per night.'I In addition, by failing to provide counselling, financial management assistance, drug rehabilitation, or
employment opportunities, welfare motels fail to address adequately
the needs of homeless people. Neither policymakers nor advocates for
the homeless would design a housing program that places homeless
families in motels for long, costly stays at public expense.14 Unfortunately, the real world with which the poor have to contend is always
more complex and unpredictable than the policymakers' most sophisticated models. In the world that homeless people experience today,
vacancy rates for affordable apartments are at an historic low and
rents are rising,15 while AFDC benefit levels have not kept pace with
these increasing costs. 16 Moreover, a large segment of the population

continues to rely on shelter assistance.17 Given this housing crisis,
Connecticut's imposing this arbitrary limit on the number of days in
which families can seek shelter in welfare motels will only intensify
the homelessness problem because it allows the state to evict people
who are still homeless. Arbitrary limits neither account for the condition of the homeless, nor address their fundamental problems.
13. On a national level, rates for welfare motels-most of which do not have cooking
facilities-average $2,100 per month. In New Haven, rates range from $70 to $90 per night.
See Tuhus, Motel Hell, NEW HAVEN ADVOC., July 25, 1988, at 1, 6.

14. Yet, for some Connecticut homeless families, the welfare motel program provides the
only relief available. The state's vast expenditure on welfare motels illustrates the absurdity of
any housing program that includes stays in welfare motels. Of course, for homeless families,
shelter in a welfare motel is better than no shelter at all. See id.
15. JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING STUDIES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE
NATION'S HOUSING 1989, at 4-6 (1990).

16. AFDC grants have not kept up with inflation. The value of AFDC grants has
plummeted since the mid-1970's. AFDC payments have declined to approximately 70% of
their 1968 value, offset to some degree by benefits like food-stamps and Medicaid. Rossi, The
Family, Welfare and Homelessness, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 281, 292

(1989).
17. According to recent estimates, 21% of the present welfare population receive a
housing subsidy. Newman & Schnare, supra note 4, at 135-45. The remaining 79% is forced
to rely on shelter allowances that are far less than the HUD allowances. Id.
HUD authorized 10-year allowance programs in two metropolitan areas under its
Housing Assistance Supply Experiment ("HASE"). See Lowry, Looking Back on the Housing
Assistance Supply Experiment, RAND PAPER SERIES P-6785, at 1 (1982). Policymakers
designed HASE to test the market and community effects of allowance programs. Id. In an
assessment of HASE's strategy and conclusions, Ira Lowry, research director of the program
since its inception in 1971, writes that "the new idea was that the essential features of a
contemplated national program could be tested by a carefully designed experiment conducted
on a relatively small scale." Id. at 9. As to the program's actual usefulness, Lowry admits that
although "[tihe experiment was undertaken to provide guidance for a national program ... a
sample of two small metropolitan areas does not provide the basis for statistical inference to
other places." Id. at 15.
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The debate over welfare motels demonstrates the profound tension between the pressures placed on legal advocates for the homeless
by the immediate needs of their clients and the long-term objectives
mapped out by legal and social theorists who study the homelessness
problem. Advocates for the homeless contend that homelessness is a
supply problem-a result of the shortage of affordable housing that
needs to be addressed by positive legislation and aggressive litigation.'" Social and legal theorists, on the other hand, define homelessness as a demand problem-one symptom, among many, of the
condition and behavior of the extremely poor.19 These theorists
charge that advocates for the homeless have exaggerated the homeless
problem by expansively defining those who deserve to be labelled
"homeless, 2 ° by inflating the actual number of homeless people,21
and by misrepresenting the causes of homelessness.2 2 They question
whether there actually is a shortage of affordable housing and offer
suggestions such as financial assistance, life management counselling,
and housing vouchers to extend aid to those individuals deserving of
18. See infra Section III of this Article for a discussion of the effect of advocacy on the
homelessness problem.
19. Conservative social policy critics have challenged Robert Hayes' assertion that the
remedy for homelessness can be depicted by three words: "housing, housing, housing."
Ellickson, The Homelessness Muddle, 99 PUB. INTEREST 45, 59 (Spring 1990). Even liberal
social policy critics, such as William Julius Wilson, view the "truly disadvantaged" as suffering
from a social pathology characterized by welfare dependency, unemployment, out-of-wedlock
births, female-headed single-parent families, and high crime rates. See generally W. WILSON,
THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY

(1987) (discussing the recurring socio-economic problems of America's underclass). These
social policy critics agree that increasing the availability of affordable housing is not a longterm solution to homelessness. See Ellickson, supra, at 59; see also W. WILSON, supra, at ix-x.
What the homeless need is job training, employment opportunities, day care, counselling,
treatment programs for substance abuse and mental disorders, and other social service
programs targeted to particular groups designed to enable the homeless or near-homeless to
cope with the world and assume responsibility for their lives. Ellickson, supra, at 59. The
relationship between temporary solutions to, and the roots of, homelessness is exemplified by
public housing projects. One need not study the permanent effects of public housing projects
to see that such projects fall short as an economical means of housing the poor. Public housing
projects ghettoize the poor by entrenching them in environments that are racially segregated,
crime-ridden, and populated primarily by welfare-dependent, single-parent, female-headed
households. See W. WILSON, supra, at ix-x. Critics of federal housing policy have argued
persuasively that these projects often result in racial segregation, and unsafe, unsanitary living
conditions. Id. Nevertheless, in today's housing market, the poor have no other option and
actually may be fortunate to end up in public housing.
20. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 46 (arguing that advocates grossly have misrepresented the
problem).
21. Id. at 52.
22. Id. at 53-56.
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assistance,23 rather than "[o]pening all purpose shelters. ",24 Characterizing the problem as a "fog of misinformation ' 25 and positing longterm social objectives, however, ignores the immediate needs of the
homeless.
This Article argues that the theoretical view of the homelessness
problem, regardless of whether it makes sense as part of long-term
social policy, is of little relevance to the homeless person's immediate
needs. This argument is made from the viewpoint of an advocate for
homeless people confronting and coping with their individual crises,
not from the policymaker's viewpoint. Legal advocates confront
homelessness as an emergency condition. It is their task to address
individuals' current housing needs, not to devise measures that may
become effective for the individual or society in the future. Advocacy
must work directly, centering upon the housing needs of homeless
people, not upon homelessness as an abstract social issue or, as some
conservative writers contend, a behavioral condition.26
This Article argues that the advocate's viewpoint is relevant to
social policy, a fact of which academic writers on homelessness take
insufficient account. Too often, critics describe advocates as wellintentioned but radical activists, focused exclusively on their clients'
immediate needs. In doing so, they contend, advocates ignore the
causes of the problems they seek to ameliorate and the enduring effect
of their advocacy both on their clients and on society. Social policy
critics seldom acknowledge, however, that the world in which we live
is not a microeconomic model, but a complex amalgam of idiosyncratic problems. In failing to do so, these writers lose sight of the
realities to which social policy must be addressed.27
Section II of this Article details conservative and liberal accounts
23. Id. at 59-60. Ellickson summarizes his viewpoint by noting that:
[G]overnments and charities should make distinctions among the homeless
instead of muddling together a highly diverse group of people. Such distinctions
would enable service providers to extend aid to, say, the casualties of
deinstitutionalization, and to cease providing unlimited and unconditional aid to
the able-bodied. The current shelter policies of many cities mire young adults in
the dependent and antisocial culture of the underclass. By now we should know
better than to provide cures that simply make things worse.
Id. at 60.
24. Id. at 59.
25. Id. at 58.
26. Id. at 57-58.
27. Advocates and theorists alike should recall Jerome Frank's admonition concerning the
interrelationship of theory and practice: "An interest in the practical should not preclude, on
the contrary it should invite, a lively interest in theory. For practices unavoidably blossom
into theories, and most theories induce practices, good or bad." Frank, A Plea for LawyerSchools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303, 1321 (1947).
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of the homelessness problem. With immediate and long-ierm social
policy concerns in mind, Section III describes three different
28
approaches taken by Yale Law School students and clinical faculty:
(1) affirmative class actions; (2) eviction defense; and (3) development
of affordable housing. Finally, Section IV argues that an effective
social policy must encompass the immediate, practical needs of the
homeless, as well as longer-term objectives that aim to address the
homelessness problem.
II.

THE DEBATE BETWEEN CRITICS AND ADVOCATES

A.

A Supply or Demand Problem?

Conservative social policy critics contend that homelessness does
not stem from problems with the supply side of the housing market,
but rather with the demand side.29 That is, the best way to increase
and improve the stock of housing 30 is to concentrate on programs that
aid the many people in our society who are socially dysfunctional,
with an eye to the risk that some may take advantage of social welfare
programs, rather than assuming responsibility for their own lives.31
Conservative commentator Charles Murray takes this characterization of the problem further, claiming that government-sponsored
social programs are actually harmful to the people they are intended
28. The author is not only director of this program, but has served as counsel to many of
the clinic's clients.
29. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 59.
30. Some social policy critics argue that new housing for the wealthy will remedy the
housing problems for the poor. The process by which housing construction for the rich results
in improvement in housing for the poor is called "filtering." R. RATCLIFF, URBAN LAND
EcONOMIcs 321-34 (1949). As new housing for the non-poor is built, families move into it,
leaving their previous apartments vacant. The demand for the type of housing they have
vacated is reduced, making it available for families with slightly lower incomes. Id. This
filtering seeps down through quality levels of the housing market, eventually allowing poor
families to move from substandard to standard housing. Id. For a recent account of the
filtering process in the post-war period, see Weicker, Private Production: Has the Rising Tide
Lifted All Boats?, in HOUSING AMERICA'S POOR 53-54 (P. Salins ed. 1987).
There is no empirical evidence that filtering actually occurs. Weicker summarizes the
evidence as follows:
Filtering is hypothesized to occur when the incomes of the rich increase, even if
During the postwar period, the income
the incomes of the poor do not ....
distribution seems to have become slightly more equal, then after 1967 slightly
more unequal, but the changes are small. Throughout the period, the poor have
increasingly lived in better housing, whether or not filtering has been happening.
Id. at 54.
Even if filtering occurs in some indirect sense, the process is irrelevant in terms of meeting
the immediate housing needs of the poor. The lack of affordable housing for the poor is a
current problem that needs to be tackled directly. The construction of new homes for upperor middle-class families is a roundabout means of achieving that end.
31. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 57.
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to help.32 One allegedly harmful effect is what Murray calls the
"moral hazard": the risk that recipients of government largesse will
become dependent on public support and will thereby be deprived of
the incentive to work and the motivation for individual responsibility.3 3 Thus, these social theorists argue, if it were not for homeless
shelters, soup kitchens, and emergency housing, many people labeled
homeless would find housing with relatives or friends, and would be
able to work to support themselves.3 4
In a recent article, commentator Robert Ellickson contends that
"homelessness is not mainly attributable to breakdowns on the supply
side of the housing market, any more than hunger in the United
States can be blamed on inadequacies in food production."3 5 The
majority of the homeless, Ellickson argues, are not ordinary people
who are random victims of a housing squeeze.3 6 Rather, the homeless
are troubled people who have had difficulty managing their lives.3 7
The construction of housing will not help them obtain what Ellickson
maintains is the solution to their problem: individualized social service programs that will enable them to exercise more rational judgment and to manage their lives more reasonably. 38 Ellickson links the
increasing size of the homeless population to the rise in our nation's
number of shelters.3 9 Shelters "draw in" some people," he argues,
who could "double-up" 4 1 with friends or family, enter an institution,
or find permanent, inexpensive rental apartments. 2 Shelters cause
32. C. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 9 (1984).
33. Id.
34. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 51 (arguing that generous programs of aid increase the
number of homeless people in a given area by attracting them from other areas).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 57.
37. Id. Despite the media attention given to homelessness in the past several years,
homelessness traditionally has been seen as the problem of troubled and bothersome
individuals. See generally Hopper, The Ordealof the Shelter: Continuitiesand Discontinuities
in the PublicResponse to Homelessness, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & SOC. POL'Y 301 (1990)

(explaining public attitudes toward the homeless throughout history). Even some
contemporary writers have referred to the homeless as freeloaders who move into shelters
seeking a good housing deal. See Main, The Homeless of New York, 72 PUB. INTEREST, 1, 3
(Summer 1983).

38. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 59.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 50.
41. "Doubling-up" often is not an option for homeless families because their primary
relatives also tend to be extremely poor. Offering shelter and sustenance to other family
members poses too severe a strain for those who are barely able to meet their own needs. See
Rossi, supra note 16, at 291. See generally P. RossI, DOWN AND OUT IN AMERICA: THE
ORIGINS OF HOMELESSNESS (1989) (discussing the origins of homelessness and the lack of
relief provided by doubling-up).
42. Ellickson, supra note 19, it 50-51.
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homelessness, Ellickson asserts, by offering negative incentives.13
Although Ellickson cites some ulterior motives that lead people
to move into shelters, 44 this treatment of homelessness is marred by
stereotypical portrayals of the homeless as lazy, troubled people who
have chosen their condition. 5 Personality traits may explain, in part,
why some people become homeless. Families do not become homeless, however, because of the lure of shelters. The inadequacy of
Ellickson's explanation is most apparent in his interpretation of a
1988 survey conducted in New York City.4 6 The survey found that

seventy-one percent of the families arriving in shelters had been
doubled-up with friends or family the previous night and that eighteen percent had been living in their own dwellings. 47 These numbers,
Ellickson concludes, show that shelters "draw mainly from housing."4 Ellickson has equated the term "housed" with housing. But,
one night spent doubled-up after an eviction, for example, does not
equal appropriate, permanent housing. By moving into public shelter,
these families had shifted into the category of those called "homeless."'49 Yet they were already homeless. That is, these people had
already left homes which they could no longer afford. Regardless of
whether these families decided to move into a shelter, it is obvious
that they did not decide to become homeless. They became homeless
merely because they were not able to pay their rent.
Ellickson rejects the idea that the homeless are normal people
who have encountered difficult times and thus have fallen into homelessness through no fault of their own.5" Advocates for the homeless,
conversely, assert that the homeless are the victims of a harshly competitive housing market, and, more generally, of a larger socio-economic order that has systematically failed to accommodate the
43. Id. at 50. A drug addict, for example, might choose to move into a shelter to free up
funds for drugs. Similarly, a jobless person housed in a shelter has less incentive to find a job
which would allow her to rent a room. Id.

44. Id.
45. Id. at 59.
46. Id. at 47.
47. Id.
48. Id. Ellickson appears to embrace two inconsistent views: (1) a social pathology
argument that poor people who become homeless are incapable of rational economic behavior;
and (2) a free-market (perverse incentive) argument that poor people who become homeless
are capable of rational economic behavior and are acting as rational utility-maximizers when
they choose to take advantage of free shelters, soup kitchens, and other social welfare measures
offered to them. Compare id. at 59 (arguing that homeless people are troubled and need help
managing their lives) with id. at 50 (noting that a drug addict, after hearing of free shelter,
would decide to move out of his room and enter that shelter).
49. See supra note 2 (text of the Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act's
definition of the term "homeless," and criticism of its narrowness).
50. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 57.
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unfortunate." Advocates have argued that because the homeless are
victims of an "endemic disorder," they deserve a "redress of grievance." 52 Because advocates believe that homelessness is the error of
the system and not an issue of individual responsibility, they have
disregarded the issue of incentives in social policy that Ellickson and
other writers find so troublesome. Moreover, by focusing on the lack
of low-income housing, advocates have overlooked the question of
whether some housing programs, such as public housing, actually
help poor people at all. These advocates fail to see the results of public housing projects which critics argue isolate poor people in racially
segregated poverty ghettos, giving rise to a tangle of social pathologies
such as crime, drugs, teenage pregnancy, single-parent and femaleheaded households, illegitimate births, unemployment, and welfare
dependency.53
B.

Social Policy Attitudes Toward the Homeless

In debates over homelessness, as in almost all social-welfare
debates, conservatives and liberals are polarized in their attitudes
toward the needy. While the conservatives tend to blame the individual homeless person for his troubles,54 liberals believe the homeless
person is an innocent victim of the economy's weaknesses."5 Conservative theorists write of the homeless person who rationally seeks
51. Leo Strole, Professor of Social Sciences at Columbia University, has written: "All [of

the homeless] are 'fall out' rejects of a highly competitive, cornucopian socioeconomic system
that cannot mobilize the fiscal wherewithal and organizational talents for quasi-family care of
its casualties." Strole, Forward to E. BAXTER & K. HOPPER, PRIVATE LIVES/PUBLIC
SPACES: HOMELESS ADULTS ON THE STREETS OF NEW YORK CITY ii (1981).
52. K. HOPPER, E. BAXTER, S. Cox & L. KLEIN, ONE YEAR LATER: THE HOMELESS
POOR IN NEW YORK CITY, 1982, at 55 (1982).

53. William Julius Wilson's book entitled The Truly Disadvantagedcharts the isolation of
Blacks and Hispanics in ghetto neighborhoods, and argues that it is this social isolation,
coupled with a narrowing opportunity structure, that has produced social disorganization and
pathology. W. WILSON, supra note 19, at ix. The plight of the urban poor, according to
Wilson, is not simply the product of different cultural norms, or the consequence of restricted
opportunities. Id. at vii-x. Instead, urban poverty results from the dynamic interplay between
ghetto-specific characteristics and the market economy. Id. Distinguishing himself from
"culture of poverty" theorists such as Oscar Lewis and Charles Murray, Wilson advocates
programs that focus on the social and economic situations-not the cultural traits-of the
ghetto underclass. Id. at ix-x; C. MURRAY, supra note 32; cf Lewis, The Culture of Poverty,
SCi. AM., Oct. 1966, at 19-25. For an interesting critique of Wilson's analysis, arguing that
Wilson shares the vice of those whom he criticizes by applying middle-class conceptions of
normalcy to the poor, see Reed, The Liberal Technocrat, THE NATION, Feb. 6, 1988, at 167.
54. See generally Ellickson, supra note 19 (arguing that many homeless people have opted
for homelessness).
55. See W. WILSON, supra note 19, at viii-ix.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:387

to maximize the satisfaction of his wants.56 This is the image depicted
by Ellickson in his portrayal of the homeless person who chooses to
move into a shelter upon declaring that move to be in her best interest." Ellickson's problem with this "rational" decision is that it will
not be in the person's long-term interest.5" For Ellickson, a sounder
long-term plan would be to double-up, strive to meet rent, and subsequently begin a search for adequate employment.5 9 The fault for the
homeless person's unsound decision, Ellickson notes, lies with flawed
federal housing policies that encourage people to enter shelters, rather
than become self-sufficient. 6° His conclusion is that homeless people
respond rationally to the incentives created by social policy. 61 In other
words, Ellickson argues that governmental policies have encouraged
the poor to become homeless by disregarding sound alternatives.
The logic in Ellickson's portrayal of the homeless person's choice
reflects the modern conservative notion that social-welfare policies
since the 1960's have actually harmed those that they were designed
to help.62 The argument begins with a premise of what would be in
56. See, e.g., Ellickson, supra note 19, at 50 (arguing that one who lives in a free shelter
chooses to stay because they will not have to work to pay for housing).

57. See source cited supra note 48 (noting that Ellickson espouses two inconsistent views
with respect to the irrational/rational behavior of homeless persons).
58. Cf C. MURRAY, supra note 32, at 9 (arguing that the poor act in ways which are
destructive in the long term).
59. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 59-60.
60. Id. at 47; see C. MURRAY, supra note 32 (arguing that governmental social policies
have made the plight of the poor worse).
61. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 53-54. The claim that all people, including those in
danger of becoming homeless, are rational utility maximizers fails to grasp the dynamics of
the emergency housing population. For most homeless families, becoming homeless is not a
matter of rational planning or of manipulating the system. Most families on the economic
edge become homeless due to an unforeseen economic event, such as a medical bill. When
these emergency situations arise, governmental benefit levels are not high enough to cushion
those who have been just getting by. See Strauss & Tomback, Homelessness: Halting the Race
to the Bottom, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 551 (1985) (arguing that those who become homeless
cannot be thought of as "rational utility maximizers"). Ellickson himself appears to have
rejected, at least in its pure form, the claim of classical free-market economists that all people
are rational utility-maximizers. See Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors: A Critique of ClassicalLaw and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23, 55
(1989) ("The mark of a true economist is not fealty to the classical rational-actor model, but
rather openness to any technique that would improve understanding of complex human
behavior.") In rejecting this claim, Ellickson purported to adopt Arthur Leff's assertion that
economists need to display a more realistic view of human cognitive processes and a more
accurate picture of social and cultural influences on human behavior. Id.; see also Leff,
Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451 (1974).
62. Following the same line of argument as Ellickson, Charles Murray warns against the
"moral hazard" created by social-welfare policies. See C. MURRAY, supra note 32, at 9.
According to Murray, the current behaviors of the poor are rational adaptations to the shift
social-welfare policies took in the 1960's. Id. Murray summarizes his argument as follows:
The first effect of the new rules was to make it profitable for the poor to behave in
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society's best interest, which is defined as not having to pay for the
homeless person's stay in a shelter. 63 Then, the argument characterizes the behavior that will bring about this end-a homeless person's
decision not to move into the shelter-as good behavior in the long
run. 6" This argument transforms the tension between individual and
societal interests into a conflict between an individual's immediate
needs and her own long-term best interests. The issue of self-care,
that is, whether the person would be better off moving into the shelter
in the long run, clouds the issue of whether she needs to do so at the
time of the decision.
Advocates' assessments of homelessness as a condition that
befalls certain types of individuals and families have diverted attention from the specific needs of homeless people.6" This is not to say,
however, that new governmental assistance programs will provide
attention to the specific needs of the homeless. The creation of new
categorical assistance programs 66 is likely merely to distinguish the
"truly homeless" from the "not really homeless." '67 As in other catethe short term in ways which were destructive in the long term. Their second
effect was to mask these long term losses-to subsidize irretrievable mistakes.
We tried to provide more for the poor and produced more poor instead. We
tried to remove the barriers to escape from poverty and inadvertently built a trap.
Id.
Federal programs, according to Murray, are responsible for the increase in the number of
families headed by women since the 1960's. Id. at 7-9. He claims that these programs have
also caused the rise of divorce rates, unemployment, welfare dependency, and homelessness.
Id. For Murray, the social pathologies of the poor are the result of the increase in governmental services. Id.
Murray treats welfare recipients as rational agents who, after accounting for their possibilities and pursuing the most advantageous course of action, have decided to sign onto the
welfare rolls. Id. Thus, the poor have become the victims not of a socio-economic system, but
of their own actions and the policies which encourage them to seek federal aid. Id. For a
persuasive critique of Murray's analysis, see Jencks, How Poor Are the Poor?, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, May 9, 1985, at 41. One of the most convincing refutations of Murray's portrayal of
welfare recipients as rational agents-who rely on benefits or have children after calculationhas been provided in S. SHEEHAN, A WELFARE MOTHER (1976).
63. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 45.
64. Id. at 50 (criticizing persons who choose to enter shelters).
65. Id. at 60.
66. Peter Rossi has proposed subsidizing families that support a homeless relative. "Aid
to Families with Dependent Adults" would act as a cushion against emergency difficulties,
allowing families to provide emergency assistance to the needy. P. Rossi, supra note 41, at
208; Rossi, supra note 16, at 299-300.
67. One pair of housing policy writers has proposed focusing assistance on those who are
persistently or permanently poor, instead of temporarily poor. See Newman & Struyk,
Housing and Poverty, 65 REV. ECON. & STATISTIcs 243, 243 (1987). According to this
proposal, permanently poor families are the most needy. They dwell in inadequate housing at
substantially higher rates than the temporarily poor. Id. at 249. For example, 40% of the
permanently poor, as contrasted with 20% of the temporarily poor, live in dwellings failing
HUD's basic quality test. Id.

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45:387

gorical assistance programs, these new classifications will likely have
the effect of denying assistance to individuals for reasons not directly
related to their circumstances.
Ellickson correctly criticizes advocates who refer to the homeless
as a "population." 6 Use of the term "population" implies a group of
people sharing the same condition. This type of categorization does
not effectively help individuals because it attempts to meet the needs
69
of the population generally, rather than the individual specifically.

The homeless are a varied group that includes people who are chronically mentally ill, physically disabled, substance abusers, unemployed
and underemployed, and single mothers with children.70 Moreover,

their housing needs are similarly diverse. 7 1 Advocates for the homeless should try to take a practical approach to assisting inadequately
housed poor people by focusing on poverty, housing costs, the availability of affordable housing, and social service needs that undermine

one's ability to find, pay for, and keep adequate housing. It is through
focusing on the precise nature of the needs of individual homeless persons, rather than on some abstract conception or theory of homelessness, that advocates can be most effective in alleviating the problems
the homeless face on a daily basis.

III.

ADVOCACY FOR THE HOMELESS

In attempting to satisfy the immediate needs of their clients,
advocates frequently are caught in a bind between meeting these
needs and assessing long-term policy objectives. Some advocacy
efforts may, by choice or necessity, implement social policies that do
not properly address the causes of the problem they confront. The
68. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 60.
69. Id. at 59-60. Peter Marcuse warns both against generalism and specialism in housing
policy. Marcuse, The Pitfalls of Specialism: Special Groups and the General Problem of
Housing, in HOUSING ISSUES OF THE 1990's, at 67 (S.Rosenberry & C. Hartman eds. 1989).
Generalism, he explains, ignores the special problems affecting particular groups. Id.
Specialism utilizes a cataloguing approach to housing problems by listing particular groups as
those who are having housing problems and is equally dangerous because it leads to policies
directed at victims, rather than at the system. Id. Marcuse argues that in order to begin
resolving our housing crisis, we need to reconcile specialism and generalism so that the
problems facing particular groups, such as the extreme poor, will be addressed. See id.at 6768.
70. Ellickson, supra note 19, at 60.
71. Homeless families' needs would be effectively met by small apartment complexes,
single family houses, or townhouses. The needs of homeless single persons with no family
would be effectively met by single room occupancy units. Finally, the needs of homeless
persons with mental or physical disabilities would be met effectively by group homes or shared
living arrangements. For a description of various housing needs for the homeless, see Salsich,
Nonprofit Housing Organizations,4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLICY 264 (1989).
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Yale Law School Clinical Program (the "Clinical Program"), discussed below, illustrates three different forms of advocacy efforts utilized by students and clinical faculty as well as the controversy
surrounding these approaches.
The first method that the Clinical Program uses in combating
homelessness is the filing of affirmative class actions by the Yale Law
School Homelessness Clinic that seek to change conditions in existing
housing or to force government to provide effective housing assistance. The latter strategy was that used in the trial of Savage v. Aronson,7 2 the welfare motel case discussed in the introduction to this
Article.73 In Savage, the Connecticut Supreme Court took note of
evidence that there were three hundred vacant public housing units in
New Haven at the time of the trial, enough to accommodate every
New Haven family in emergency housing.74 What the court failed to
acknowledge, however, was that those three hundred vacant public
housing units are boarded-up and uninhabitable. The local public
housing authority has failed to keep them in repair, has allowed them
to be vandalized, and has failed to renovate them for occupancy. 75
Thus, although the advocates' victory in the trial court potentially
could have housed virtually all of New Haven's homeless, that victory
was short-lived andonow requires new creative solutions to attempt to
force the public housing authority to restore those vacant housing
units to public use.
In an earlier attempt to remedy the homelessness problem in
urban Connecticut, the Clinical Program filed a lawsuit styled Concerned Tenants Association v. Pierce76 in the Bridgeport Housing
Court in 1987 on behalf of a Bridgeport tenants' association and individual tenants of the largest public housing project in Connecticut.
The complaint named as defendants the Executive Director of the
Bridgeport Housing Authority and the Secretary of the United States
72. 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (1990).
73. See id; supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
74. See Savage, 214 Conn. at 281-83, 571 A.2d at 710. The dissent would have remanded
the case with instructions to the trial court to join additional defendants and fashion a remedy
that would have transferred the affected families from emergency to public housing. See id. at
288-92, 571 A.2d 713-15 (Glass, J., dissenting).
75. It is unclear whether homeless families, especially those who are not on a public
housing waiting list, would have a legally cognizable claim against the housing authority to
force renovation of uninhabitable units. See id. at 281 n.31, 571 A.2d at 710 n.31. Similar to
the welfare motel case, advocates would have to stretch legal theory to create a claim. If they
prevailed, advocates would be again subject to the criticism of social policy theorists that such
zealous advocacy has the effect of perpetuating a socially undesirable program in the form of
large, high rise, inner city, public housing ghettos. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 54 (arguing
that advocacy is making homelessness worse and more visible).
76. 685 F. Supp. 316 (D. Conn. 1988).
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Department of Housing and Urban Development."
The complaint alleged that the Bridgeport Housing Authority,
which was receiving federal financial assistance, was violating state
and federal law by failing to maintain the housing project in a decent,
safe, and sanitary condition.78 The tenants' association charged that
conditions in the project, including a failure to repair, an absence of
security, and a lack of sanitation, coupled with a deliberate refusal to
rent vacant units as part of a plan to depopulate, and eventually shut
down, the project, amounted to a constructive demolition in violation
of federal law.79

The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut
agreed, and mediated a settlement that required the Housing Authority to repair and renovate the units, provide additional security,
including paid tenant patrols, and rent the vacant apartments.80 As a
result, the Clinical Program has helped to preserve one thousand
units of affordable housing.
Both Savage v. Aronson,"' the welfare motel case, and Concerned
Tenants Association demonstrate the profound tension that exists
between the responsibilities placed on advocates for the homeless or
near-homeless by the immediate needs of their clients, and broad
questions of social policy and legal theory. The critics of federal
housing policy have made a strong case that public housing projects,
like the one involved in the Concerned Tenants Association lawsuit, do
not provide adequate low-income housing for the poor.8 2 Public
housing projects do ghettoize the poor, result in racial segregation,
83
and often create unsafe and unsanitary living conditions for tenants.
They are also very expensive to build and to maintain.84 Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept the conclusion drawn by many critics of
public housing85 that we would be better off without public housing
77. See id. Secretary Pierce and the United States Attorney's office, apparently believing
that the Secretary could not receive a fair trial in a local state housing court, removed the case
to federal court. Id. at 318.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 319.
80. See id. at 321 (stating that plaintiffs had established a cause of action for constructive
demolition). The settlement provides for a reduction in the total number of units from over
one thousand to approximately five hundred, with the concurrent development of an
equivalent number of scattered-site units of public housing. The remaining units will be
demolished and rebuilt without common entrances.
81. 214 Conn. 256, 571 A.2d 696 (Conn. 1990).
82. See generally C. MURRAY, supra note 32 (criticizing welfare state policies as doing
more harm than good).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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projects. The Clinical Program's Bridgeport clients are now safely
housed; the clients could have become one thousand homeless
families.
Legal defense of poor tenants in eviction cases is a second
method that advocates for the homeless use to combat homelessness.
In the Yale Law School Landlord/Tenant Clinic, dubbed the "prehomelessness clinic," Yale students and faculty defend a substantial
number of indigent tenants in eviction proceedings. The proceedings
generally consist of evictions for failure to pay rent, tenancy expiration, or some form of nuisance. Eviction proceedings in Connecticut,
as in virtually every other state, follow summary procedures.8 6
Because summary process affords landlords a speedy remedy for
evicting tenants,8 7 courts require strict compliance with procedural
provisions and substantive requirements of summary procedure statutes."8 Thus, effective tenant representation involves highly technical
motion and pleading practice. The tenant's advocate must effectively
raise the issue of improper service of process, failure to provide services to tenants, and non-compliance with local housing codes.8 9
Needless to say, landlords do not like it when tenants they seek
to evict are represented by competent counsel. Summary process
becomes, in such cases, a complex, and non-summary series of technical and creative motions and pleadings, court appearances, negotiations, evidentiary hearings, stays of execution, and other timeconsuming procedures. 90 In the course of such proceedings, landlords
often will enter into settlements that allow tenants time to relocate,
waive unpaid back rent, return security deposits, grant several months
of future reduced-rent or free occupancy, pay moving expenses, or
even reinstate tenants in good standing. 91
Social policy and legal theorists have criticized the practice of
vigorously defending poor tenants in eviction proceedings on several
grounds. Critics claim that eviction defense has the long-term effects
of causing landlords to increase rents, to upgrade rental properties to
avoid leasing to poor people, and to abandon their buildings. 92 Legal
critics have accused tenants' lawyers of over-representing a few ten86. See Note, Legal Services and Landlord-TenantLitigation:A CriticalAnalysis, 82

YALE

L.J. 1495, 1496 (1973) (explaining legal aid services' handling of eviction suits).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1497-98.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. This has been the experience in the Clinical Program. But see id. at 1498 (arguing that
despite efforts by tenants' lawyers, landlords usually win judgments of possession).
92. Id. at 1501-02.
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ants, rather than representing the needs of all poor tenants.13 They
also charge tenants' lawyers with abuse of the legal system by taking
advantage of technicalities to gain time or tactical advantage for their
clients. 94 Finally, in what is probably the most significant attack, critics contend that eviction defense fails to increase or improve the stock
of affordable housing. 9
The low-income housing stock has decreased for several reasons.
Many cities have revitalized their downtown centers and gentrified
neighborhoods in the process. 96 Further, some landlords with apartment buildings that have fallen into disrepair have abandoned them in
an attempt to avoid substantial property tax liens. Vigorous eviction
defense for poor tenants, however, is not the cause of these developments. Even if it were, declining to represent fully indigent tenants
would neither be an ethical nor appropriate option to combatting
homelessness. Advocates cannot simply devote their efforts to the
development of affordable housing, which may take years to begin to
alleviate the housing crisis, while poor tenants become homeless people through improper eviction procedures.
Markets respond to effective demand. An increased demand for
low-income housing does not necessarily result in an increased supply
of such housing. When the poor lack sufficient financial resources to
pay the rents demanded in the low-income housing market, lowincome housing becomes an unprofitable investment. 97 As a result,
many developers stop building affordable housing which, in turn, further decreases its availability. Markets tend toward allocative efficiency, but not toward any particular distribution. Thus, the market
does not guarantee affordable, decent housing at every economic level.
Yale University has created the Workshop on Shelter for the
Homeless (the "Yale Workshop") in an attempt to meet the criticism
that advocacy does little to increase the amount of affordable housing
in light of economic supply and demand cycles. The Yale Workshop
responds to the homelessness problem without focusing on landlordtenant litigation. It is a transactional workshop in which students
from the Yale Law School and the School of Organization and Man93. Id. at 1499-501.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1502.
96. Gentrification is a process by which poor, inner-city neighborhoods are upgraded into

more affluent communities. The process leaves the poor displaced. Hopper, Susser &
Connover, Economies of Makeshift: Deindustrializationand Homelessness in New York City,
14 URB. ANTHROPOLOGY 11, 12 (1985).
97. Other factors affecting the profitability of developers' investments include property
taxes, building codes, health and safety regulations, repair costs, and real estate prices.
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agement provide legal and other technical assistance to organizations
developing and managing affordable housing for the poor. The Yale

Workshop seeks to stimulate an increase in the low-income housing
stock in the Greater New Haven area by incorporating and obtaining
tax exemptions for non-profit housing corporations by assisting nonprofit groups in fund-raising through preparation of grant applications to public agencies and private organizations, and by negotiating
and closing real estate transactions.

Social policy critics from both the right and the left, however,
have begun to argue that increasing the availability of affordable
housing is not a long-term solution to homelessness.98 What the
homeless need, critics contend, are job training, employment, day
care, counselling, and treatment programs for substance abusers and
the mentally ill.9 9 They argue that only social service programs
designed to enable the homeless to cope with the world and assume
responsibility for their lives will confront the core of the homelessness
problem, which they define as the extreme poverty, unemployment,
and social dislocation of the poor. °°

As Peter Rossi has argued persuasively in his book Down and
Out in America, 1 a direct relationship exists between extreme poverty and homelessness." °2 Clearly, homelessness is a consequence not

only of a low-income housing shortage, but also of poverty, unemployment, and social dislocation.103 Yet, the essential and immediate
symptom of the problem is lack of access to affordable housing."
98. See Ellickson, supra note 19, at 59.
99. Id. at 58-60.
100. Id. One contemporary writer offers hard evidence that social service programs work
effectively when they respond to a variety of needs. L. SCHORR, WITHIN OUR REACH:
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DISADVANTAGE (1988). The programs that work for children at

risk of becoming homeless offer comprehensive and intensive services. Id. at xxi-xxii.
Whether they are part of a health, mental health, social service, or educational system, these
programs are successful because they provide a variety of services that are attuned to the
distinct needs of high risk families. Id. at xxii. If the outstanding health, education, and social
services described in Schorr's book were more widely available, fewer children would arrive at
adulthood uneducated and unskilled.
101. See P. Rossi, supra note 41.
102. See generally id. (analyzing the causes of homelessness and possible remedies for the
problem). Rossi has five proposals to combat homelessness:. (1) the enlargement of the urban,
low-income housing stock; (2) the institutionalization of the severely disabled; (3) the
recognition of certain non-physical disabilities; (4) the restoration of value to welfare payments
in terms of purchasing power; and (5) the allowing of unattached, non-senior citizens to
participate in welfare programs. Rossi, supra note 16, at 299.
103. Rossi, supra note 16, at 298-99.
104. See P. RossI, supra note 41, at 182; see also Stone, Shelter Poverty in Boston: Problem
and Program, in HOUSING ISSUES OF THE 1990's, at 337-41 (S. Rosenberry & C. Hartman eds.
1989) (arguing that nearly all of our nation's present housing problems result from the tension
between inadequate incomes and the cost of providing affordable housing).
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Homeless people simply cannot find appropriate housing at prices
they can afford.
More low-income housing will not, in itself, end homelessness.
Nevertheless, increasing the stock of affordable housing, as students
are attempting to do through the Yale Workshop, is one necessary
step in addressing the immediate needs of homeless individuals and
families. Attacking homelessness means addressing both the shortterm problem of how to ameliorate immediately the condition of
being homeless, as well as devising long-term policy changes that will
reduce the risk of becoming homeless.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It is within the existing housing market that advocates work to
meet the needs of their homeless clients. While it is unclear whether
failures in this market require governmental intervention in the form
of subsidies, taxation, regulation, or social welfare programs to assist
the poor in the long run, there can be no realistic or humanitarian
argument that such governmental actions are not necessary in the
short run. 10 5 Poverty, a shortage of affordable housing, and ineffective governmental policies are realities that the homeless confront.
Advocates must work within these realities to make the existing system better for their clients. Within the existing housing system, effective immediate actions might merely serve as short-term solutions, but
do not reach extreme poverty, unemployment, and social dislocation-the roots of the homelessness problem. Nevertheless, creative
advocacy efforts that focus on the immediate needs of homeless people must continue and should be developed further. Merely attempting to change the behavior of homeless people, or allowing the market
to correct itself, does not provide solutions to the immediate needs of
homeless individuals. Effective social policies should account for both
the immediate and the long-term dimensions of the homelessness
problem. Social decisions take place in response to a fluctuating,
imperfect world. Often, these decisions respond best to crises. Social
solutions must be based on the world we know, not on an ideal far
removed from the everyday lives of people.
Welfare motels are inadequate. Government should not have to
pay for them, and people should not have to live in them. Other
105. Compare A. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1938) (a classic work supporting
governmental intervention) with Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(arguing that governmental intervention is not needed to resolve externality issues). For a
criticism of the prevailing interpretations of Coase's theories, see Ellickson, The Casefor Coase
and Against Coaseanism, 99 YALE L.J. 611 (1989).
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short-term and short-sighted measures to address the immediate
housing needs of poor people may be similarly flawed. Moreover,
some variant of the moral hazard' 016 argument may be right. More
rational policies should be possible, and the search for them is a
worthwhile-indeed an essential-endeavor. In the meantime, however, advocates for the homeless must deal with the problems confronting their clients today and tomorrow. If fulfilling ethical
obligations to clients imposes excessive governmental costs, zealous
advocacy may have the beneficial long-term effect of providing economic incentives to government to devise more rational policies.

106. There is another kind of moral hazard in all of this: that government will fail to
acknowledge an obligation to ameliorate the effect on the poor of an increasingly deregulated
housing market in which more and more poor people lack the financial resources to secure
affordable housing.

